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THE INSTABILITY OF THE FAMILY:
A JURIDICAL DIAGONOSIS
By. FRED Ruiz, LL. B., J. D.'
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT-Two major contetions are up-
held by this paper: First, that it is the duty and the necessity of our
political, legal and social institutioons to sanction and maintain the nobil-
ity and integrity of the home as the seat of family life; Second, to exhibit
the manner in which this necessary function of government should be dis-
charged. In the order named, these two propositions are considered un-
der several heads respectively, as follows: I. The discussion of the gov-
ernmental sanction involves (1) The supreme importance of the family as
the unit of social life and organized progress: (2) The fact that there ex-
ists and is increasing a marked instability of the family relations; (3) The
direct, obvious and logical responsibility for this disastrous condition,
resting upon the State because of its policy and practice in its political
and legal systems; (4) The proofs of this responsibility are clear and
convincing, and are required by the modern tendency to deny, defy and
deride both the value of family stability and responsibility for its instab-
ility. II. How the State should perform its proper duty in the premises
involves (1) The indissolubility of validily consummated marriage, as a
fundamental tenet of Christianity; (2) The historical and judicial deter-
mination that our government is explicitly committeed to Christianity,
as the basis of its institutions and the spirit of its civilization; (3) The
ideal indissolubility is not a mere religious abstraction, but a practical
necessity, the disregard of which inevitably and universally leads to pol-
itical and social degeneracy; (4) Specific suggestions as to the sanctions
the government owes to the ideal of indissoluble marriage.
It is apprehended that a substantial contribution might be
made toward definiteness. and clarity by an anticipation of the
method of attack;- a more informative expression of the object of
this modest endeavor, and the means contemplated to achieve that
object. The purpose of the paper is to established the contention
(1) that our government, our institutions, our legislautres and our
I A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the College of Law of the Univer-
sity of Norte Dame, for the Degree of Juris Doctor, June, 1928.
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courts must sanction the noble, dignified integrity of the home,
and (2) to indicate how our political institutions should sanction
the integrity and stability of the home.
Almost within the last generation, the family has come into
public consciousness as the matrix of a constantly growing social
problem. It is not alone an increase in the more obvious .forms
of family disorganization, such as divorce, separations and deser-
tions, and marital discord, that cause concern; these explicit
forms are recognized as but the overt expressions of a new con-
ception of the family, uneasily.felt but as yet largely undefined.
It is precisely this new conception of the family that shall' be,
after all, the chief concern of this paper.
Although divorce and the other symptoms of marital dis-
cord and family instability are only expressions of this new con-
ception of the family, yet this conception can not be intelligently
discussed without a casual allusion to these symptoms. The dis-"
cussion of a subject of this nature cannot possibly be confined in
any one channel; its treatment cannot be purely technical or
purely academic. Religion cannot be excluded; sociology, ethics
and morals must be miscible with jurisprudence. Let these pre-
liminary observations be remembered, and thoughts of incoher-
ence and irrelevancy be indulgently reconsidered before they are
allowed to settle.
I.
"The unit of the social state is the Family, first in the order
of human development and fundamental in the constitution of
organized society. However progressive and perfect may be-
come the forms of social control through the ages, whatever laws
and institutions impair the natural integrity of family life are es-
sentially in derogation of the original unit'of civilized society, and
should be the subject of vigilant scrutiny and suspicion," are the
opportune words of Judge Wobten 1, with a complacent allusion
to this citation and the distinguished gentleman who authenti-
cates it, the dire necessity of the integrity of the home will be dis-
missed.
But not only will the importance of the integrity of the home
be thus passed by, but also the fact that this integrity is at present
r"Dudley G. Wooten, in "Lectures on History of the Laxw." delivered at
Notre Dame College of Law, 1927.
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
very seriously impaired will be left to the daily observation of our
papers and magazines and the life about us, with the pertinent ob-
servation that the annual report ot the Federal Commerce De-
partment shows that in 1926, marriages increased by 1.2 per cent
over the 1925 total, while divorces increased 3.1 per cent, and that
divorce continues to increase faster than marriage in the United
States.2
There can be no safer vehicle for this argument than a dis-
passionate, authenticated review of the history of marriage, and
the official judicial principles to which our courts have so lucidly
subscribed and committed our political institutions. We need
start no earlier than the so-called "Reformation". The "Reform-
ation" "emancipated" the individual, and an immediate expression
of this emancipation was the secularization of marriages-the re-
cognition of marriage as a contract instead of as a sacrament-
and the substitution of the civil for the religious ceremony.3 From
that event dates the responsibility of the State, logical, fund-
amental and heavy, to exalt the dignified integrity of the home
and "to guard them from disturbances from without".4
It seems to have come from high places that the State is not
in any way bound to preserve the integrity of the home; that this
is rather a matter for the personal judgment of the individuals
concerned; and that in the generous indulgence of these individual
circumstances lies the welfare and stability of society, rather than
in the sacrifice of the'individual to an abstract social good. This
attitude is spreading throughout the land like the hot, molten lava
of the roaring volcano, it has already begun to rot the foundation
of society, and the stench of this organic decomposition is pollut-
ing the very air that we breath.
But the responsibility of our political institutions is so clear
that "those who run may read". When the State assumed con-
trol of these matters, it accepted the corresponding responsibility
in much more unmistakable terms than a casual allusion to his-
tory would possibly reveal. It recognized the relation of mar-
riage as a civil contract instead of a sacrament, but it made it
plain, through its judicial tribunals, that it was to be recognized
as a contract siti generis, not as an ordinary contract. It has made
t "The South Bend Tribune," November, 1927.
3 Ernest R. Mowrer. "Family Disorganization" (1927).
4 Justice Manning In Green -.. State, 29 Am. Rep. 739.
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it plain that the will of the parties, once the contract is consum-
mated, shall be entirely subordinated to the will of the State
speaking through its legislatures and courts for the public good.
The Supreme Court of Maine has said that "It is not a contract
within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution which pro,
hibits the impairing the obligation of contracts. It is, rather, a
social relation.., the creation of the law itself; a relation, the most
important as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step
from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social
life and the true basis of human progress"., The Supreme Court
of the United States tells us that "It is something more than a
mere contract. The consent of the parties, is, of cburse, essential
to its existence, but when the contract to marry is executed by the
marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they
cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted or
enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not
so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and
holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an
institution, in the maintenance of the purity of which the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. ' 6 These views have been questioned, but they have
weathered the storm every time undisturbed, and today there is
no dissent from them throughout the length and breadth of our
land, and it would only be an affection of research to cite the
judicial corroborations listed in these two cases.
But if the responsibility is on the "State", it may be more
specifically traced to the legislature. It is that unit of our political
organization which is most directly burdened with this responsib-
ility. The division of government into three departments, and
the implied inhibition upon the legislative department to exercise
judicial functions, was neither intended nor understood to exclude
legislative control over the marriage relation.7 In fact, the power
of prescribing by general laws what causes shall constitute suffi-
cient ground for a divorce, and what shall be the consequence of
a divorce founded on the ascertainment of these causes, is strictly
within the legislative competency and its exercise is intrusted to
5 Adams v. Palmer, 61 Me. 481, pp. 484, 485.
6 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.
7 Mfaynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.
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the legislative discretion, 8 and whether the legislation is wise or
unwise may be a question on which opinions differ, but with it the
courts have no concern; their duty is to enforce the law as they
find it.9 The legislature may, therefore, authorize the granting
of divorces by the courts for any cause deemed by it to be suffi-
cient.1o
The family is the original cell, which by a process of multi-
plication has come to constitute the corpus of society. That is
too obvious for citation of authority. Any elementary text in
sociology or political economy will substantiate that statement.
The purpose of law is to regulate society. The basic, natural and
logical concern of the State and its political institutions, then,
with the welfare, the tranquility and the stability of the family
would seem to be too plain for argument. But the responsibility
of our political institutions in this regard has been deemed a very
important part of this paper, because our political institutions
have not seemingly recognized their full responsibility, and proof
will be advanced for that;, because many of the prominent mem-
bers of our profession have not been big enough to appreciate
their duty in this regard, and proof will be given for that; because
prominent and notorious social lights and popular celebrities have
ridiculed, and some have criticized, rather naively, all concern
about the stability of the family, and that will be substantiated;
and, finally, because the public is becoming contaminated also
with the notion of voluntary dissociation, if such an indulgent al-
lusion may describe such a devastating evil.
Let us dwell first on the irresponsibility of our political in-
stitutions. It has been shown that the legislature is the institu-
tion primarily responsible for the care of the home. That is the
branch of our government to say when and how and where the
State shall intervene. A mere enumeration of the grounds for
divorce established by the legislatures throughout the union will
fill any sincere exponent of durable monogamy with apprehen-
sion, ranging as they do from the situation in South Carolina,
where divorce is impossible for any cause, to that of Washington,
where a decree will be rendered "for any other cause deemed by
8 Gaines v. Gaines, 48 Am. Dec. (Ky.) 425.
9 Robinson v. Robinson, 23 A (N. H.) 1362. 15 L. R. A. 121.
10 Hickman v. Hickman, 24 Pac. (Wash.) 445.
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the court sufficient". 1" But if the legislatures do not deem it pol-
itic to insist too much on the continuity of the marriage relation,
let that aspect of the question be reserved for the second branch
of the subject, where we have agreed to discuss the manner in
which this responsibility should be borne. But the courts, where
the power so majestically reposes to interpret the will of the leg-
islature, 12 have forgotten their very specific confinement to this
power' s and the settled impropriety of exceeding it, and have
positively pandered to public sentiment. Obvious to the true
value of their charge, they have vacillated when they should have
stood firm in defense of their charge. It need not be shown again
how the State has declared that the contract of marriage shall be
a peculiar contract, entirely beyond the will of the parties after it
has once been consummated. But the courts have not adhered
to this judicial principle:
Oh, yes, they proclaim it officially, but they have discharged
it in practice. How completely this is borne out by everyday life
about us! The legislature may say, for example, that divorce
shall be granted for extreme cruelty. 4 What constitutes extreme
cruelty must be d-ecided by the courts. 5 Judicial precedence liter-
ally exudes to show that there must be either actual violence com-
mitted, attended with danger to life, limb or health, or a reason-
able apprehension of such violence. 6 There may be much un-
happiness from unkind treatment and from violent and abusive
language, "but the court ought not to interfere, it must leave the
parties to the correction of their own judgment; they must bear
as well as they can the consequences of their own choice. 17 That
logic rings true. The State has said the will of the parties shall
not prevail. So the courts continue to say today, but they argue
that this husband has been extremely cruel to his wife because he
has called her a bad name, or, say, the mental anguish in which
the wife has so pitilessly thrown her husband by a thoughtless
charge of infidelity or adultery, constitutes unmistakable extreme
ii H. Gerald Chapin, of the N. Y. Par, in "Everybodys", 33:341. Sept. 1915.
12 Smith v. Strother, 8 P. (Cal.) 852 (Semble).is RobnsoAn v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600 (Semble).
14 N. H. Laws (ed. 1830) 157.
is Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600.
i, Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Con. 35; Chesnutt v. Chesnutt, 1 Splnks 196; Barrere
v. Barrere, 4 Johns. Ch. 187; Mason v. Mason, 1 Edw. Ch. 278; Hill v. Hill, 2 Mass.
150; Warren v. Warren, 3 Mass. 321; French v. French, 4 Mzss. 687; Harratt v. Har-
ratt, 7 N. H. 196; 8 N. H. 307; 141 Mass. 495.
17 Harris v. Harris, 2Ph. Bee. 111.
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cruelty. That would surely be to pander to public sentiment,
and an out-right concession to individualism, though disguised
under an obedience to the will of the legislature and a gesture for
the public good.
Is that possible? Well, it has been done.' 8  Petty vexations,
even though they wear out the animal machine, are certainly not
cases for legal relief, not unless th'e will of the parties is to be sub-
stituted for the jurisdiction of the State, and the implication of
the public good is to be discarded for the satisfaction of the indi-
vidual. "People must relieve themselves against -such natural
vicissitudes of life as well as they can, by prudent resistance,--by
calling in the succors of religion and the consolation of friends;
but the aid of courts is not to be resorted to in such cases", is the
consoling attitude of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 9
But the Supreme Court of Georgia seems to have forgotten that
judicial sanity and precedence and public policy demand the will
of the parties be entirely suppressed after the consummation of a
valid marriage, and it has gone to the ridiculous extent of legal-
izing polygamy by allowing a divorce for nagging.2 0
So it seems, then, not to multiply illustrations further, that
the courts have a tendency to regard the statutory conditions of
the legislature as mere blanket terms, "The testimony of the cases
showing a variance between the legal cause for divorce and the
natural cause, and so legal causes thus represent nothing more
than standards to which family discord must be made to conform
before the State will grant a divorce".2 '
"And so we have to reckon with collusive divorce, which,
when both parties are agreed on severance of the bonds of matri-
mony, makes incompatibility the decisive factor, provided suffi-
cient evidence be trumped up to satisfy one of the legal statutory
grounds." That is the outspoken opinion of a recent judge of
the Probate Court of Boston.22 Hence we blame the courts for
not shouldering the full responsibility that is theirs; and we
charge that "the divorce-court judges, whom we might expect to
18 178 Cal. 548: See also R Ore. 100; 60 Tev. 61; 76 Ind. 136: 23 Ind. 546.
For acts of "cruelty" other than physical. see notes in IS b. . A. (N. S.)
300; 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224; 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669.
i9 66 IN. H. 600.
2o0 125 S. E. 856.
21 Ernest R. MNowrer, in "Family Disorganization" (1927).
22 Robert Grant, "SMarriage and Divorce", in "Scribner's Magazine",
66:193-8, Aug. 1919.
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find eager to detect the underlying causes of divorce, give little
or no attention to its underlying causes". Such is he experience
of Judge Hoffman of the Domestic Relations Court of Cincinnati.3
The Judge is quoted as saying that, "In a city of one of the south-
ern states, a judge grants a divorce in all cases, holding that the
mere fact of the filing of the complaint is sufficient to warrant a
decree"; and that "there are few divorce applications refused in
any jurisdiction; all are granted without any investigation of the
family conditions, or any inquiry as to the truth of the charges".
Idem. It does seem, then, that our political institutions have not
recognized their full responsibility, and such is the apprehension
of no less a distinguished commentator of the law than Schouler,
who has written that "At the present rate and in the present di-
rection, there is danger lest the sanctions of the courts to marriage
and divorce be practically superseded during the next century by
private discretion and individualsm." 24
Again, it was suggested that it might not be futile to expati-
ate on the obvious responsibility of our political institutions to
defend the integrity of the home, because many of the prominent
members of the Bar have not been big enough to appreciate their
duty in this regard. This phase need not be unduly elaborated,
but one need only to be reminded of the fact that the lawyers have
a great deal to do with the nature and amount of the evidence in-
troduced into court and the manner of its presentation, as officers
of the court, in order to distribute, to them their just due of the
blame already indicated that rests so heavily on our courts for
this exaggerated leniency in our marital affairs. Some time ago,
a Divorce Proctor was appointed by the courts of Kansas City,
whose duty it was to appear in behalf of the State in uncontested
divorce cases, and he found that people were getting divorced
for such trivial things as a dislike of each others hair, under the
trumped-up charge of incompatibility; and he found also that he
could not decide whether to blame the perjurers themselves or the'
lawyers,--"the dishonest attorneys who are only after the money
the divorce decrees will bring them", he is reported as having de-
scribed them. "He had letters in his files from the attorneys on
the other side suggesting that they 'get together, because it would
2S Rollin Hartl, "Habit of Getting Divorced", in "World's Work", 58:403-
9, Aug. 1924.
z4 Schouler, Vol. 2, Sixth Edition (1921) p. 1721.
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be easy to separate the couple and divide the pile' and other ab-
undant evidence of his suspicions". And he is credited with this
confession: "From what I have seen and learned of the view-
point of people of today of marriage and divorce, I am convinced
that not once case in ten is legitimate." 25
Furthermore, the opinion of prominent members of the Bar,
nationally known men, on these matters, necessarily influences
the public mind. Judge Lindsey very distinctly repudiates the
judicially settled characterization of the marriage relation as the
sole concern of the State and beyond the whim of the individual.2 6
The notorious Clarence Darrow, the self distinguished criminol-
ogist, has displayed the inane asininity,--and these strong words
have passed unrestrained because such a raucous contradiction of
jtdicially settled polity deserves no other name,--this gentleman
has displayed the inane asininity to express the thought that to
him, from whatever standpoint, "The only question relating to
divorce is: Does it promote pleasure or pain?". 2 7 That would
be a more fitting question for swine in the contemplation of a
nice, muddy puddle of water.
The responsibility of.our political institutions to sanction the
dignity and integrity of the home, so patently abvious, has been
undertaken to be shown because there have been, there are, and
there will be, notoriobs social lights and popular celebrities to
ridicule all concern about the stability of the family. From the
pages of a daily newspaper of only yesterday, to denote with that
word that it is very recent, a distinguished matron seems to look
at the reader very complacently and above the picture the words:
"Tells her idea of motherhood". The lady is none other than
Miss Sylvia Pankhurst, age thirty seven, militant suffragist leader
of pre-war days in England, and her ideas of motherhood are
nothing less than very remarkable and quite startling.
She does not believe in marriage, and she astonished her
neighbors by announcing the birth of a son, in the columns of a
labor newspaper, and, expressing herself as strongly opposed to
the marriage contract, she explained that her son was the child
of a happy union of affection, declining to reveal the name of her
25 Courtney Ryley Cooper, "Man Who is Casting Out Divorce", in "Ladies'
Home Journal". 31:20, March 1914.
26 Judge Ben Lindsey, "Modern Youth".
27 Chicago Herald, Tuesday, Dec. 27. 1927.
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son's father because he was averse to publicity. The choice of
words of this exuberant woman is flagrant,--and fragrant-con-
tempt of court: "I consider marriage is a personal question",
she is reported to have said, "and should rest entirely upon affect-
ion. It is regrettable it should be subject to a legal contract." 28
How vividly come to mind those beautiful, judicial concepts of
marriage, undisturbed to this day as the law of the land: "the
purest social tie and the true basis of human progress";29 "the
foundation of the family and of society";8O "the true 'officinae
gentium';" "the nurseries of the State"."1  And, let it be written,
that this travesty on the most sublime of social relations be more
fully exposed: the sensational announcement of this reputably
sensational woman will have the support and the sanction of the
Liberal Church of Colorado, and Bishop Frank Rice of the Lib-
erty Church announced in Denver, Saturday, the seventh of April,
that a resolution of commendation and indorsement of Miss
Pankhurst's action had been unanimously. adopted at a special
session of the ecumenical council of resident cardinals, arch-
bishops, bishops and other officials of the church, a copy of the
resolution to be sent to Miss Pankhurst.3 2
The screen celebrities, ephemeral perhaps, but in the public eye
just the same, and oracles to many people, have their ideas on
motherhood and marriage also. Seeking a divorce from her second
marriage, the incomparable Gilda Gray insisted "the grounds are
nobody's business; they are purely personal".3s She will not even
concede the court the dignity of a coffee pot. And Jessie Reed,
former "Follies" girl, obtained her fourth divorce with no ap-
parent intention of remaining single or repenting her fourth es-
trangement, observing that "Three years of married life is about
enough for anybody." 4
Finally, the obvious responsibility of our political institu-
tions to sanction and exclusively supervise and control the mar-
riage relation has been thus ultimately substantiated and authen-
ticated, because the public has become contaminated with the
notion of voluntary dissociation and has begun to believe that
28 The South Bend Tribune, Thursday Eve., April 5, 1928.
29 51 Me. 481.
so 125 U'. S. 190.
s1 29 Am. Rep. 739.
82 Chicago Hrrald, Sunday. April 8, 1928.
s8 South Bentd Tribune, Monday, December 14, 1928.
s3 Chicago E;e. hyerican, Saturday, February 4, 1928.
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perhaps it is true after all, that it is not the business of the State,
and that it is not a matter of "the highest public concern." This
episode of our story may be told in four words: Feminism, In-
dividualism, Emancipation and Burlesque. Recently, just a few
montlis ago, a distinguished economist in one of our universities
wrote a very interesting book, sc.holarly and generously authen-
ticated, on family disorganization. 5 In this book, the professor
tells us a thing or two about a very interesting popular movement
in our very midst today, "the Feminist movement". The aim of
this popular movement is explained as: "more freedom in sexual
relations for women"! The outstanding exponent of this move-
ment is credited with this philosophy: "It is a lying contention
that the conduct which in these respects is regarded as proper
corresponds in any way to -our truly vital needs. The truth is
that the sexual life is the focal point of every healthy being whose
instincts have not undergone partial or complete atrophy, that
upon full satisfaction of sexual needs depends the true equilibrium
of the mental, no less than the physical personality".36 Mr. Mow-
rer cites her as one of the true representatives of the modern fem-
inist movement, and quotes her and others to the effect that this
attitude is one of the aims of that movement: more freedom in
sexual relations for women. And "Feminism thus recognizes",
continues Mr. Mowrer, "few obligations to society as a basis for
family life, but rather stresses the amatory and sexual needs of
the individual." A recent edition of one of our dailies reports the
completion of plans by the woman's party to put Congress on
record on a proposed equal rights amendment to the federal con-
stitution, and the news item concludes with this paragraph:
"Despite the advent of woman suffrage and the general progress
of the feminist movement, the woman's party contends that wo-
men still have a hard fight ahead to achieve a complete equality
of opportunity with men". s 7
Individualism is another influence, or philosophy, or call it
what you -please, permeating the public consciousness, shaping
public opinion, and rather palpably affecting the popular notions
of the marriage relation. This philosophy preaches the personal
schematization of life,-making one's own definitions and deter-
35 Ernest R. Mowrer. "Family Disoranization, 1927.
36 Grete Meisel-Hess, "The Sexual Crisis", p. 117. cited by Mowrer on p. 17.
37 Soseti Bend News-Times, Thursday, December 29, 1927.
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mining one's own behaviour norms. Carrying this ideal into
family relations, the individual asserts his right to seek whatever
union will give him the greatest opportunity to express his per-
sonality and to dissolve as freely marital ties when they become
oppressive. 38 We must give serious attention to the fact that in
the United States there is a great divergence of inherited stand-
ards, laws and customs regarding the basis of marriage, the right-
eousness or wickedness of possible divorce, and the propriety or
impropriety of remarriage after domestic changes, which confuses
the matter. For want of a clear ideal of religious values and so-
cial demands involved, the rule of personal desire and individual
idiosyncrasy has too great predominance. Here, where ethical
doctors disagree, and moral teachers differ, youth makes its ideal
an exaltation of romance in marriage and mature years demand
the right of the most extreme individualism.
Finally, to show how little the public regards the marriage re-
lation as "the highest public concern", let us take the last two to-
gether: Emancipation and Burlesque. The dependence of the
woman upon the man, and the peculiar nature of all the economic
functions of the old fashioned home were always a vital consti-
tuent in the stability and solidarity of the home.
Specialization in industry and the movement of population
from the country to the city have taken away almost all the eco-
nomic functions of the home and led to the "emancipation" of
women. The multiple opportunities of urban life for women to
become self-supporting have released her from economic depend-
ence upon man. Hence, marriage is not so imperative as form-
erly, and after marriage, the woman can break the family relation
without necessarily endangering her livelihood. As late as 1860,
divorces were still rare. 9 It was not until after the Civil Waf
that the doctrine of woman's emancipation began to show results.
The vews of the earlier exponents of the emancipation of women
were distorted, and they were made to appear as fullfledged pro-
ponents of a free-love campaign. So unpopular was their cam-
paign that they were ridiculed and ostracized. Influential people
of that time were not disposed to tolerate any views impairing the
marriage relation. But the fashion of publicity making light of
38 Thomas' "The Unadjusted Girl", p. 86, cited by Mowrer ante.
39 North American Review, April, 1860.
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marriage began to spread. So-called comic papers of wide cir-
culation and vaudeville shows abounded in jokes and alleged
witticisms on marriage, while serious writers professing to have a
mission wrote books and plays either openly or adroitly attacking
and mocking marriage. 0 By 1881, the divorce question had be-
come such a scandal that the "New England Divorce Reform
League" was organized by leading Protestants and Catholics. It
was made a national organization in 1885, it was at the solicita-
tion of this body that the United States government made its
-first investigation of niarriage and divorce, and from those in-
vestigations accurate figures are obtainable for the forty years
from 1867-1906, showing a steady and alarming increase in the
divorce rate from the first report to the last.41 With such an at-
titude, the public cannot be said to regard the marriage relation
as "the purest social tie" and "the surest basis of human pro-
gress". The levity with which marriages are often contracted is
amazing and disheartening. Young persons who have never
considered each others' spiritual fitness for life-long companion-
ship, who have not given a serious thought to the obligations of
parentage, rush into matrimony as if it were a transient fete. Some
times the wedding is made a prank or a show at a fair, on a train,
in an airplane, or elsewhere, to gain prestige for "smartness". A
couple were married recently in an airplane as it circled above
Portsmouth, Ohio, the ceremony being a feature of the opening
of a new air field.42 In a recent case, the parents decided to separ-
ate and flip a coin for the child.4- A couple were recently married
in a fraternity-house cellar in Annopolis, Maryland, substituting
"until love .dies" for "until death do us apart": Fraternity men
dressed in female attire acted as bridesmaids.4 This is not the
worst of it. Such persons never seem at a loss to find a justice
or a minister to "solemnize" their travesties of the nuptial vows.
The following description of a notorious wedding resort which
formerly existed in Michigan illustrates the shocking frivolity
with which the most important of human relations is sometimes
treated: "It is estimated that fully 20,000 people will visit this
4o Julia Johnson, "Marriage and Divorce", H. V. W4lson, Co., N. Y., 1925.
41 Gustavus Myers, "Rapid Increase of Divorce" in Curreit Hist. Mag., N. Y.
Times, 4:816-21, August 1921.
42 Chicago Herald, November 13,1927.
48 Chicago Herald, February 20, 1927.
44 Tises-Picayune, of New Orleans, February 7, 1928.
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city to-morrow to attend the third annual Maccabees' county
picnic. It is thought to-morrow will prove to be the greatest day
in the history of St. Joseph as well as Gretna Green of Chicago.
Fully forty-four bridal couples will arrive from Chicago to take
advantage of being. married free, as is offered in a part of their
program. The parties with matrimonial intentons, upon calling
at the Marriage Temple, will be furnished by County Clerk Need-
ham with their licens'e and a handsome marriage certificate, free
of charge, provided they. consent to be married in public from the
veranda of the hotel. Any clergymart in the city, upon request,
will officiate. Hundreds of excursionists from Indiana will come
for the express purpose of witnessing the ceremonies"., On
October 10, 1919, a press dispatch in a Los Angeles newspaper
stated that at the Convention of the American Legion in Kansas
City, the Rev. John W. Inzer, Chaplain of the legion, and a local
jeweler had announced that all ex-service men might marry at the
convention free of charge. Inzer would perform the ceremony
free, the jeweler would furnish the ring, and the other expense of
the ceremonies would be borne by the convention fund.46
So, then, the responsibility of the State and our political in-
stitutions to sanction and guard and promote the integrity and
the solidarity of our homes and the stability of the marriage re-
lation, while so much a matter of course, has been discussed,
proved and authenticated because it has been questioned, dis-
puted and burlesques. Now, let us examine the second object
of this paper: How ought this responsibility be borne?
II.
In the elaboration of the previous argument, it was found
necessary to begin with two presumptions. The symmetry is al-
together fortuitous, but two presumptions must be requisitioned
for this emergency also. In the fashion of the preacher, I take
my text' from the tenth chapter of Mark, second to the twelfth
verses: "What, therefore, God has joined together, let no man
put asunder". I preach the indissolubility of validly consum-
mated marriage, and I urge that the responsibility of the State to
guard and protect the stability and integrity of the marriage re-
lation and our families and our homes demands nothing less, and
45 George Elliott Howard. "Bad Marriage and Quick Divorce", in Journal
of Applied Sociology, 6:1-10. Decemnber 1921.
46 Idemn.
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nothing more, than the unremitting, relentless and adamantine
sanctions of our political institutions to exhalt the ideal of in-
dissoluble monogamy,-the grim and inexorable determination
of our political institutions to refuse, always and forever, under
any and all circumstances, to dissolve any validly consummated
marriage with complete emancipation of the parties. Here, in-
deed, there is burden of proof, and the very suggestion starts an
audible murmer and a perceptible stir among the vast numerically
preponderant recalcitrants, but that can only make the undertak-
ing more profitable and interesting. Both the indissolubility of
validly consummated marriage as a fundamental principle of
Christianity, and Christianity as the essence of our political and
social integration shall be presumed with a passing reference to
the authorities amply substantiating them.
If the indissolubility of validly consummated marriage is a
fundamental principle of Christianity, and our government is ex-
plicitly committed to Christianity, then the lassitude of our pplit-
cal institutions is a violent contradiction and a betrayal of the
basic precepts of our political existence. Sufficient data and-
authority has been gathered to satisfactorily establish these ob-
servations; but to present all this material here would entail an
undue prolongation of this paper. They shall be presumed, with
just passing comment and a few allusions and sufficient citation
of authority to justify the presumption. Christianity is the sys-
tem of doctrine and precepts taught by Christ.47 There are many
religions beside the Roman Catholic professing to follow the pre-
cepts of Christ, and many sects professing to be Christian, because
there are as many differences of opinion as to what the precepts
of Christ are; but the Catholic religion, more particularly the
Roman Catholic stands firm, "the only breakwater to the advanc-
ing tide of social immorality in our country"'48 in its recognition
of marriage as a soacrament, as dissoluble, once validly consum-
mated, only by death. Reputable and distinguished authorities
have denied it :9 but history, unbiased refutes them all: Nicholas
and Lothaire, Clement VII, Henry VIII, Catherine of Aragon
47 Webster.
48 Albert Be-nedict Wolfe "Marriage and Divorce".
49 Bryce "Studies In History and Jurisprudence" Vol. 11 p. 433; Lecky
"Pemocracy and Liberty" Vol. 11 p. 193; Pollock and Maitland "The History
of the English Law Before The Time of Edward 1 Vol. 11 p. 393; Edward
Westermark "The History of Human Marriage" Vol. 111 p. 376.
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and Anne Boleyn and the loss of a great nation from the Faith;
Pius, Napoleon I, Josephine and Marie Louise,--the lives and
deeds of all of these are an embarrassing answer to those who try
to impeach the prestige of the Church.
But the proofs of the Catholic Church for the divinity of the
command that no man shall put asunder are as accessible and in-
telligible and conclusive as they are claimed to be authenic. 50 The
Church has analyzed, scrutinized, compared and reasoned and
concluded these authorities to substantiate its position,"' and a
distinguished layman gives us a scholarly and exhaustive treat-
ment of them in the American Catholic Quarterly Review. 2 And
let the delusion never be harbored that the sacramentality of
marriage is ornamental but let it be known that it is a vital attrib-
ute of the relationship itself.5
Our nation has been explicitly and unmistakably committed
to Christianity. The distinguished Dudley G. Wooten, jurist,
scholar and author, at present teaching at the Hoynes College of
Law at the Unversity of Notre Dame has sufficiently proved it.
I refer you to him. 54 The Christian religion was always recog-
nized in the administration of the Common Law, and so far as
that law continues to be the law of the land, the fundamental
principles of that religion must continue to be recognized. 5  Hol-
land said in Cowaat z,. Milbourne "It has long been laid down, and
has only been recently questioned that Christianity is part of the
law of England. ' '56
The distinguished authorities cited prove both that the in-
dissolubility of consummated marriage is a fundamental principle
of Christianity, and that our own government is explicitly com-
mitted to Christianity, but- because these authorities have been
pointed out rather than cited and discussed, it has been thought
best to consider these arguments presumed rather than proved;
but the way is paved for the arresting interrogation of James
Cardinal Gibbons "How can we call ourselves a Christian people,
so Matt. XIX 12; Mark X 2-12: Luke XVI 18; 1 Peter 111. 1-7: Matthew V
31, 32.
51 Seventh Canon of the 24th Session of the Council of Trent.
52 H. A. Brann. Am. Cath. Quart. Rev., July, 1883, Vol. VIII, pp. 385-404.
5s Leo XIII, Encyc. "Arcanum".
54 "Church and State in The United States", in "The Catholic Builders of
The Nation" Vol. 1 pp. 61-89.
55 T. M. Cooley, cited by Webster.
56 L. R. Ex., 230, 234.
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if we so flagrantly, shamelessly, legally violate a fundamental law
of Christianity ?"57
But the ideal of indissolubility. is not a mere religious ab-
straction, but a practical necessity. That is why a student of the
Law has chosen it as a fitting subject for a legal thesis, and its
sociological and religious and ethical a§pects have been incentives
as evidence of its added importance, rather than deterring ir-
relevancies. Marriage is a contract made in due form of law, by
which a mian and woman reciprocally engage to live with each
other during their joint lives, and to discharge towards each other
the duties imposed by law on the relation of husband and wife.58
The law recognizes no other definition of marriage. The ideal of
indissolubility is rather fundamental law than a mere religious
abstraction. Our courts, and not alone the Church, tell us that
"It does not mean a temporary agreement to dwell together for a
time for the gratification of sexual desires, but ft is essential that
the contract be entered into with a view. to its continuance
through life."5 9 Of course this is not to say that a marriage may
not be dissolved. It has already been indicated how and when
and where and why- the Stat6 has claimed the right to do that;
but our courts, sensible, practical and political institutions and not
religious, have recognized such a possibility as" a contingency of
so remote expectation as not to enter into the ordinary calcula-
tions of the duration of the relation of married life; as one of those
extreme cases, which like earthquakes and tempests in the natural
world, or like public executions in the history of individual ex-
istence, do, indeed, sometimes occur, but which no one feels bound
to expect or provide against."6 0  And the law, as well as religion,
"presumes that when parties enter into the bonds of matrimony,
they do so with a full realization of the frailties of human nature
and with full recognition of their duty of mutual forbearance of
the faults of each other".61
Justice Manning, speaking for the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama has said that "The institution of marriage is indeed the most
interesting and important of any in society. It is through the
marriage relation that the homes of a people are created-those
57 "Divorce". in Century, 78: 145-9 May 1909,
58 2 Bouvier. 2097.
59 Olsen v. Peterson, 33 Neb. 358, 50 N. W. 155.60 William Mattocks v. John Stearns, 9 Vt. 325 (Sernble).61 Marshals v. Marshals, Ann. Cases, 1916, E, p. 206, 115 Ark. 51. 170 S. W. 567.
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homes in which, ordinarily, all the members of all the families of
the land are during the part of every day assembled together;
where the elders of the household seek response and cheer, and
reparation of strength from the toils and cares of life; and where,
in an affectionate intercourse and conversation with them, the
young become imbued with the principles and animated by the
spirit and ideas, which in a great degree give shape to their char-
acters and determine the manner of their future lives. These
homes, in which the virtues are most cultivated and happiness
most abounds, are the true 'officinae gentium'-the nurseries of
the State. While with their interior administration the State
should interfere as little as possible, it is obviously of the highest
public concern that it should by general laws adapted to the state
of things around them, guard them against disturbances from
without"*62 That may possibly remind one of the impassioned
flow of the Chautauqua lecturer, but this is not sentimentaliy;
it is one of our own august judicial tribunals laying down the law
of the land.
Now we have reached the prope stage to-dispel a very fund-
amental error. There are many cases, very many of them, where
the husband is unfaithful and abuses his wife and positively en-
dangers her life and that of her children every day of their con-
tinued propinquity, and forbearance cultivates martyrdom. Is it
politic, just or ethical .to refuse them the right to dissolve such
hopeless incompatibility? No! Decidedly not! Such a couple
should separate, and the quicker the better; such a wife should
petition for a divorce, and such a wife should readily obtain the
same in any enlightened government. But that does not diminish
the ideal of indissolubility; it makes it more difficult to under-
stand but it does not dim the lustre of that ideal in any way; it
does not prove that indissolubility is a mere religious abstraction.
There are three distinct kinds of separations known to the law,
viz., the declaration of nullity, separation and divorce. The first
is merely a declaration of that which has only appeared to be a
marriage, never to have been a marriage; the second allows the
two to live apart but leaves no one free to marry again while the
other lives; the third is a complete separation with the freedom
62 Green v,. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am. Rep. 739, 742.
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denied by the second.63 The first two will cover all cases that
have raised the question of the social and political expediency of
indiisolublity and leave the ideal of indissolubility,-the unyield-
ing determination of the State to never grant the third kind of
separation to ever permit a re-marriage of the one during the life
of the other of the parties-,the only worthy ambition of a Chris-
tion nation in the solution of its domestic problems, and the only
conclusion of political expediency in our domestic relations. The
second method of separation is sometimes alluded to as a divorce
'a mensa et thoro", and that is why it may be said that a divorce
might sometimes be granted, with undiminished loyalty to the
ideal of indissolubility. So, one John Cowan, a distinguished
medical doctor, with neither bias for religion or politics makes a
contribution to our cause when he says "A wife who, although do-
ing all that her best nature can do to make her married existence
an enjoyment, is nevertheless abused, maltreated and wronged in
any of the many ways that sordid, licentious, brutal husbands may
demonstrate, is perfectly justified by the laws of Nature in separ-
ating or being divorced from such a husband, the same argument
applying with equal force to the man when the wife is the trans-
gressor. Yet, though I hold divorce to be necessary under these
circumstances I do not allow that it is right for either man or
woman to marry again".4 The author is a doctor of medicine,
not a theologian or a student of jurisprudence. What are his
reasons? "It savors 'too much of uncleanliness, adultery and
fornication, and it runs contra to all that is pure, clean and chaste
that a separated or divorced man or woman should marry again"
And this profound student of human nature unsuspectingly tells
us it is impolitic also: "Besides, such men and women are apt
to make precisely the same mistake in forming new unions, mak-
ing the institution that should be divine in its nature and observ-
ance, a mockery and a farce". The temptation has been resisted
to indulge in a very interesting discussion of the inconstancy of
human emotions, and extensive and specific citations could be
"dissected",- classical65 , analytical66 , and judicial 67 to show how
susceptible human nature may be to the ravages of legislation ex-
63 Bouvier.
64 John Cowan M. D., "The Science of a New Life". p. 386.
65 Addison, "The Spectator", "A Coquette's Heart".
66 Chassay, "Touchstone of Character".
67 Lanhan 2'. Lanhan, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804.
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alting the individual too high above the social good; but the words
of the distinguished Sharswood cannot be withheld: "Though in
particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obliga-
tions of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity
upon individuals, yet if must be carefully remembered that the
general happiness of married life is secured by its indissolubility.
When people understand that they must live together, except for
a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mu-
tual accomodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake
off. They become good husbands and good wives from the neces-
sity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a power-
ful master in teaching the duties it imposes. If it were once un-
derstood that upon mutual disgust, married persons might be
legally separated, many couples who now pass through the world
with mutual forebearance, with attention to their common off-
spring and to the moral order of civil society, might have been
at this moment living in a state of mutual unkindness and intoler-
ance, in a state of estrangement from their common offspring and
in a state of most licentious and unrestrained immorality. In
this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals
must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good".68
In the midst of this complacency and lassitude, let us invest-
igate the conundrum-when is a divorce not a divorce? The law
is a mighty jester. Here is one of its merriests jests. Can a man
be both married and single, a woman both the wife and the mist-
ress of the same man, children both legitimate and illegitimate at
the same time? And the point of the jests is that he, she and
they can be. Absurd? Not a bit. It is eminently logical. In-
frequent? A mere academic possibility? Not at all. It is the
condition of thousands of our fellow citizens, who, finding the
laws of their own commonwealths not sufficiently favorable, have
traveled to Nevada, Washington, and other ?7easy divorce" states.
The awful results are only beginning to be felt, and not even be-
ginning to be popularly realized. When, in a few years, some of
the many who have divorced and remarried under the present
easy going regime, die, and their estates are in a process of settle-
ment, complications will be endless. Women then will learn
68 Sharswood's "Blackstone's Commentaries". Vol. 1. p. 440 quoting
Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Rep. 36.
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they are not widows, and men that they are not husbands. The
case of Mrs. Kimball, or rather Mrs. Semon is in point. She mar-
ried Mr. Semon in the state of New York in 1885. Five years
later she went to North Dakota, and after remaining ninety days,
brought an action for divorce. The papers were handed to Mr.
Semon in New York, but he did not appear in the suit, and the
North Dakota court granted Mrs. Semon her divorce. In 1891,
she returned to New York ,and four years later went through a
second ceremony of marriage with Mr. Kimball. A year later
Mr. Kimball died, leaving no will. According to religion and the
moral law, that woman had contaminated her immortal soul with
the stigma of adultery. But there are some who would consider
that a mere religious abstraction. What did the law say was
the situation of this woman? There has been much discussion
as to the recognition by one State of a marriage in an6ther, but
his paper shall not be encumbered with that digression. What did
the courts of New York say? The rendition of the North Dakota
decree made her a divorced woman in that State, and North
Dakota gave her the privilege of remarriage. But in New York
she was still the wife of Mr. Semon. Her -elatinos with Mr.
Kimball were adulterous. Nor had she a scintilla of claim to this
property. His collateral relatives alone could inherit. So de-
cided the New York Court of Appeals in 1908.69 Neither need it
be urged that this reluctance of the State of New York to recog-
nize the dissolution of North Dakota violates the full faith and
credit clause of the federal constitution.7 0
Let one more instance be submitted to vanish the delusion
that the ideal of indissolubility is a remnant of some ancient reli-
gion and to show the political and social and judicial embarrass-
ment that inevitably results from the discard of indissolubility.
The State of Illinois has a law, providing "That in every case in
which a divorce has been granted, neither party shall marry again
within one year from the time the decree was granted, and every
person marrying contrary to the provision of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than
one year, nor more than three years, and said marriage shall be
69 RI. Gerald Chapin, of the New York Bxr. "United States of Matrimony",
70 Andrews v,. Andrc,:s, 188 U. S. 14; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175; $treitwolf v.
Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179.
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held absolutely void."7 1  It is a firmly rooted principle in our jur-
isprudence that no jurisdiction will enforce the purely penal pro-
vision of another.7 2  Laws such as the statute cited, supra, have
usually prohibited the marriage of the party in fault againstwhom
the divorce was granted, and they have been construed as penal
in their nature and having no extra-territorial effect. That is to
say, if the Illinois statute should be regarded as penal, e. g., a per-
son marrying in Illinois, getting a dvorce-there and going to Mis-
souri, say, for remarriage immediately thereafter, the marriage in,
Missouri would be valid because the State of Missouri would not
be bound to recognize the penal statute of Illinois, and neither
comity nor the federal constitution nor anything else could stand
in the way of the refusal of Missouri to -recognize the Illinois
statute, and consequently if the party should return next day to
Illinois, he would have evaded the Illinois statute altogether.
That precise dilemma has arisen again and again." But enough
of that.
This all leads to the primary object of this paper: to the in-
sistence that the State and our political institutions must sanction
the integrity and stability of the marriage relation, and that the
only logical, effective, sane and judicially sound way to do that
is to sanction indissoluble monogamy. And let there be no mis-
apprehension as to what is meant by "sanction". It is a synonym
for ratification, ordinarily; but in Law, the word has a technical
significance. Used in this technical sense, it refers to 'ithe:detri-
ment, loss of reward, or other coercive intervention annexed to a
violation of a law as a means of enforcing the law".4' It is in this
sense that this term is used in this paper: the intervention an-
nexed to a violation of a law as a means of enforcing it. More
particularly, and without further argumdnt, in view of all that has
already been submitted, it is submitted that it is the duty of our
legislatures,--if the responsibility to say when and why and how
the marriage relation should be termrinated as has been shown,
rests here,--to refuse absolutely such a dissolution of that rela--
tion once lawfully consummated, as will allow a remarriage of
either party during the life of the other. There should be no such
1
71 Sec. 1 a Chapter 40 Hurd's Stat. 1911 p. 862.
72 Huntington v'. Attrill, 146 U. S. 617.
78 Connauwcalth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458. 18 Am. Rep. 509; Van Voorhis v.
Brintnall. 86 N. Y. 18. 40 Am. 'Rep. 505: State %,. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403. 38 A. 81.
74 Webster.
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a thing as a complete, divorce "a vinculo". A recent judge of the
Probate Court of Boston has said that "It may be reasonably
doubted whether any people in occiddntal lands has marriage
laws so defective as ours".75
To begin our suggestions: "Majority" is the law's simple
device for securing mental maturity in the graver affairs of life.
Is not wedlock as serious a business as making a will or signing
a deed? The ages below which a marriage may not be contracted
ought to be that of legal majority for both the man and the wo-
man. They are not,--but let that be dismissed with a reference
to an exhaustive and authenic corroboration by Swindlehurst,7
and the passing observation that at Common Law, the' age at
which an infant, whether male or female, reaches full majority is
fixed at twenty-one years,77 and that at that same Common Law,
males above fourteen and females above twelve are capable of
contracting a valid marriage. 78 That's wrong. The law should
fix the minimum age for marriage at twenty-one and penalize its
infraction. Immature marriages are a prolific source of evil, in-
cluding divorce. Why should the parent have the power of legal-
izing them by his consent? 79 And not only may the parent by his
consent legalize such impolitic marriages, but, generally, n6t even
his consent is required to legalizo them, the general rule being,
that unless the statute expressly declares a marriage contracted
without the necessary consent of the parents to be a nullity, such
statutes will be construed to be directory only, so that the mar-
riage will be held valid although the disobedience of the, statute
may entail penalties on the licensing or officiating authorities.80
The law should hold such marriages void, and impose penalties
for its infraction.
We need also a better license system, so as to secure full
publicity and faithful compliance with the law.. This Will be
secured by the inclusioni of a provision for the announcement of
intention to marry so that at least ten days advance notice shall
be given before he issuance of the license. Only five states now
7s Robert Grant, "marrlage ! and Divorce",' in 'Scribner's Mag. 66:193-8
Aug. 1919.
76 "Some Phases of The Law of Mar-riage" 30 HPaTv. Law Rev. 124.
77 22 Cyc. 511.
78 Fisher v. Bernard, 65 Vt. 664.
79 Cuslina, v. Cushman, 80 Wash. 615; Broadening %. Browoning, 89 Ran. 98;
Kruger v. Kruger, 137 App. Div. (N. Y.) 289; 14 Col. L. Rev. 688.
80 Reiftchneider v. Reilschneider, 244 Ill. 92.
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require such an advance notice of from two to five days.8 '
Again, it is suggested that it will serve the best interests of
our domestic relations to abolish the common law marrage. It
has been urged that a more rigid licdnse system is necessary. The
abolition of the Common Law marriage is the logical thing to
fellow. The Common Law marriage ignores the license alto-
gether. It has been said that marriage is merely a civil contract,
differing from any other contract only in that it is not revocable
at the will of the parties; that the essence of the contract of mar-
riage is the consent of the-parties, as in the case of any other con-
tract, and whenever that is present the contract of marriage is
completed."2 No citation is deemed necessary to call to mind the
universal practice of requiring the recording of mortgages, so that
one may not buy property already sold, to put it that way; and the
registration of deeds, that the public may know who own this or
that property; but it seems not necessary at all to take such pains
with the marriage relation. No marriage should be valid until
properly recorded, and cohabitation therein should be punished as
fornication. But, lo and behold, it has been held that it is this
very cohabitation that constitutes the essential element in the
validity of such an un-licensed, Common Law marriage.83 The
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
has published his reaction: "A Doctrine that requires two persons
to be guilty of thd crime of fornication a number of times before
they create the legal status of matrimony is absured. Yet this is
exactly what is required in a number of American states. Again,
where will the line be drawn? Who shall say where the line will
be? When do the parties cease to be fornicators and just when
does the sublime institutions of matrimony begin? The usual ar-
gument advanced in favor of these unions is that they render the
children legitimate. This was the brief argument of the Supreme
Court in 1878. But the fact is overlooked that a great number
of these unions are not and were not intended to be permanent.
The parties just 'quit' as they call it, and go through a marriage
ceremony with someone else. If the first union was not a mar-
riage, the children are illigitimate and if there were no children,
the parties at any rate, were guilty of fornication against which
81 Robert Grant, ante.
82 Hulett v. Carrie, 66 Minn. 327.
83 Lori,ncr v. Lorimer, 124 Mich. 631.
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there are strict statutory provisions in many states. If the first
union is held a valid ceremony and a good marriage in order to
legitimize the children, the children of the subsequent marriage
are bastards and if there were no children of the second union, the
parties ought to be made liable for polygamy or adultery, but the
law seems to be majestically, loftly unconcerned. The! American
Bar Association and practically every Writer on the subject of
Marriage has condemned the Common Law marriage. One says
'no *doubt our Common Law marriage is thoroughly bad, involv-
ing social evils of the most dangerous character . .. a custom
which legalizes and virtually invites impure and secret unions'.
Another asks 'is it not an amazing fact that in a matter which so
profoundly affects the dignity and stability of the family, society
should be so slow to take enlightened action?' And an eminent
Scotch lawyer has said 'the law makes clear and full provisions
for contracts affecting the sale of houses and lands, horses and
dogs, and goods and chattels of every description; and why mar-
riage, the most important of all human contracts, should not be
as anxiously defined and thus placed beyond the reach of both"
fraud and doubt appears to me to be one of the greatest anomolies
in the law of a Christian country'."8 - This distinguished member
of the Bar gives also a complete table in his article,'of the situation.
on this matter in the states and possessions of the United States,
and another such list may be found in Decker's "Digest of the
Law Relating to Common Law Marriages".85 Common Law
marriage should be compldtely abolished, and nothing left to'take
its place but the full, -unrestrained operation of the statutes on
fornication and bastardy.
And again, the difficulty was discussed earlier, of the con-
struction of a statute forbidding remarriagd within one year as
penal and therefor not to be enforced by another jurisdiction. * It
was observed that Illinois had such a statute but that a party
might obtain a divorce in Illinois and marry in Missouri next. day
and return to Illinois tlqe ndxt and evade the statute completely.
No suggestion was made as to a remedy, the observation being
made at the time merely to illustrate the social and political em-
barrassment resulting from a disregard of the ideal of indissolub-
8$ "Common Law Marriage" Otto Koegel in "Family" 4:172-5 Nov. 1923.
85 Appended to Woodruff's "Domestic Relations" Third Edition.
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ility. Here is, a suggestion. It is easy to make, because it is
merely a suggestion of the adoption of a happy solution already
evolved in some jurisdictions and the suggestion is made that it
be adopted in the rest. The state of Wisconsin has a similar
statute and the same difficulty-has arisen there, and the solution
of tle court is submitted verbatim: "Upon no reasonable ground
can this general restriction bd explained, except that the Legis-
lature deemed that it was against public policy and good morals
that divorced persons should be at liberty to immediately con-
tract new marriage. The infdrence is unmistakable that the Leg-
islature recognized the fact that the sacredness of marriage and
the stability of the marriage tie lie at -the very foundation of
Cliristian civilization and social order; that divorce while at times
necessary, should not be made easy, nor should inducement be
held out to procure it; that one of the frequent causes of marital
disagreement and divorce actions is the desire on the part of one of
the parties to marry another; that, if there be liberty to immedi-
ately remarry, an inducement is tl us offered to those who have
become tired of one union, not only to bdcome faithless to their
marriage vows, but to collusively procure the severance of that
union under the forms of law for the purpose of experimenting
with another partner, and perhaps yet another, thus accomplish-
ing what may be called progressive polygamy; and, finally, that
this means destruction of tt e home and'debasement of public
morals. In a word.; the. intent.of the Maw plainly is to remove one
of the most frequent inducing -causes for "the bringing bf divorce
actions. This means a declaration of.public policy or it means
nothing. .It means that the .Legislature regarded frequent and
easy divorce as against good morals, and that it proposed, not to
punish the guilty party, but to remove an -indficdinent to frequent
divorce. To say that the Legislaure intended such a law to apply
only.wile the parties are within the boundaries of the gtate and
-that it- contemplated that by crossing the state line, its citizens
could successfully nullify its terms, -is to make the aet essentially
useless and impotent and ascribe .practical imbecility to the law
making power. A construction which produces- such an effect
should not be given if unless the terms of the Act make it- neces-
sary. The prohibitory terms are broad and sweeping. They de-
clare, not only that it shall be unlawful for divorced persons to
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marry again within the year, but that any such marriage shall
be null and void. There is no limitation as to the place of the
pretended marriage in express terms, nor is language used from
which such a limitation can naturally be implied. It seems un-
questionable that it was intended to control the conduct of the
residents of tbhe state, whether they be within or outside of its
boundaries. Such being in our opinion, the etvident and clearly
expressed intent of the Legislature, we hold that when persons
domiciled in this state and who are subject to the provisions of
the law, leave the state for the purpose of evading those provi-
sions, and go through the ceremony of marriage in another state
and return to their domicile, such pretended marriage is within
the provision of the law and will not be recognized by the courts
of this state".8 6 The Supreme Court of the United States also
looks at this problem in the same manner, 7 as well as a number
of other of our states, among them Tennessee,88 Oregon,89 and
Pennsylvania90 and Illinois.91
Moreovdr, there is needless confusion of the contract to
marry with the contract of marriage. The former is an agreement
to marry9 2 ; the latter is the consummation of that agreement,
not any longer regarded as a contract-but rather as a statu. 98 The
law sanctions the former, the contract to marry, by the imposition
of damages upon the party breaching the contract, to be paid to
the other party to the contract 94 ; but it has no such sanction for
the conract of marriage, except incidentally perhaps, as alimony, a
divorce "a vinculo" putting an end to" 'all obligations of either
party to the other.9 5 That is wrong. Of course, the State, having
excluded the power of the parties to tdrminate the marriage rela-
tion, any termination being effected by the State can hardly
charge either party witlq damages for breach of any contract: but,
the incongruity remains just the same. It is inconsistent with
the nature and purpose of these respective contracts, to sanction
the enforcement and the bond of the contract to marry and to in-
86 Lanlzam v. Lanham. 136 Wis. 360. 117 K. AV. 787. 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804.
87 State v. Tutty, 11 Fed. 753, 7 I. R. A. 50.
88 87 Tenn. 244. 10 S. 'V. 305.
89 31 Ore. 480, 50 P. 802.
9o 183 Pa. 625. 39 L. R. A. 539.
9i 256 I1. 460, 100 N. E. 222.
92 Perkins v. Hersey, 1 R. I. 493.
9s Maynard v,. Hill, 125 U. S. 190.
94 Gross v. Hochstim, 72 Misc. (N.-Y.) 343.
95 Barrett v. Failing and Wife, Ill U. S. 523.
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dulge the dissolution of the contract of marriage. The very free-
dom of the two parties in a contract to marry; their unrestrained
and uncoerced volition; tl~eir spontaneous, ingenuous disposition
are the surest safeguards of the stability of the consequent rela-
tionship to which the courts have been so repeatedly committed.
The mere change of heart, then, should completely absolve a per-
son from his contract to marry if he so chooses to be absolved, and
nothing impresses one so.much in his study of Domestic Relations
as this astonishing practice of the courts to compel a party to such
a contract who has suffered a change of heart, to suffer in addition
thereto, a pecuniary loss for a transaction entirely beyond his
control. Th human emotions are inconstant, and love is no ex-
ception. The only dependable basis for an enduring alliance be-
tween a man a woman is spontaneous love for each other. Not
only that, but a sincere, clean, respectable alliance can not spare
this element of human attraction. That being so, it would seem
that no respectable motive in any intention to marry could prevail
without a good taste of this human emotion. But one who knew
human nature has written that "Love is a gift thlat nature sows
with a grudging hand in the furrows of human heart"' 96 and an-
other, that it is "inconstant and capricious" 97, and so it would seem
that if love springs in the heart of a human, it is no fault or credit
of his; nor can any diminution or complete cessation be attributed
to h im. Erotic love is a form, an aspect, a force or something or
other of human nature that comes and goes-though it is not al-
ways nomadic; but it is essentially beyond human control. Con-
sider then, the unique indispensability of spontaneous, mutual
erotic love in a happy union and consider the proverbial fury of a
woman scorned and try to imagine the popularization of suits for
specific performance of contracts to marry. It would be the most
crass impolicy to give the slightest sanction to such a thng. Is
it not almost as bad to allow damages in these cases, and to place
the limit of those damages entirely within the discretion of the
jury, as is the praftice of the courts ?98 But that is not all,-if the
spontaneous and uncoerced mutual consent of the parties be es-
sential and it be impolitic to sanction in any way the bond of a
repented contract to marry, then how much more impolitic it
96 Balzxc.
97 Chassay.
98 Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339.
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must be to sanction the enforcement of a contract to marry where
the repentant party is seriously ill. It would seem to best serve
the interests of society to kdep hese people apart. But the law
will extort damages from such a person and his illness is no de-
fense.99 What irony, indeed, to compare that gesture of the law
with justification of the claim of the State to the righ to cut the
Fallopian tubes of suspects to prevent the unfit from continuing
their kind. 00 And when one would expect the courts to be con-
cerned only with the domestic prospect of a happy home, and to
subdue at least, all other motives for contracts to marry, one finds
nothing but disappointment in thWe words of the court "If the
plaintiff was willing, in view of defendant's social position, or that
which she might acquire by reason of his wealth, to marry him,
and await his restoration to health, she has the riglt to insist upon
the benefit of the unconditional cbntract"."I In the nourishment
of these spontaneous apprehensions, it was no small gratification
to stumble across the corroboration of a distinguished chancellor
in the English House of Commons: "When they found that
actions of that kind were scandalously abused, it was time that
the action should justify itself, that they might see on what found-
ation it resteed. The action for breach of promise was not so an-
cient as some persons might be disposed to imagine. This coun-
try flourished for many centuries without any person thinking of
bringing an action of this descrption .... there was no flavor of
venerable antiquity surrounding it".-' 2 The chancellor gave it as
his opinion that "the law was abused in very many cases", in so
many cases that it was better "the action should be abolished".
The Harvard Law Review has this to say about it: "Anomalous,
practically an action of tort, with heavy damages claimed and
often given, and used sometimes as a method of blackmail, some-
times as a means of expressing tle indignation of all good jury-
men against faithless swains, it forces the courts into a commer-
cial view of what properly cannot be regarded as a matter of
trade or dicker". 01 The Roman law did not allow an action for
damages where there was a mere breach of a promise to marry.
99 Hall v,. Wright, El. B1. & El. 745 (hemorrhafge of the lungs).
100 Buck v. Bell, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584.
101 Smith v. Conipoti. supra.
102 134 Law Times 201 Lord Chancellor Herschell in the House of Com.
mons.
i0 7 Har. L. Rev. 372.
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And this is the law in Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland
and Chili.104 But emotions are as inc'onstant this side of matrimony
as on the other, and the same reasons whicl sustain any suggest-
ion of the facilitation of the dissolution of a contract to marry
would seem to prevail .in a contract of marriage. Yes, indeed,
how true it is that the ties of marriage, by assigning a legitimate
object to the--passions, still do not-dry up the source-of agitation
and the capricious restlessness which the "eiart.conceals; but, in
the ceaseless ominagnetic field of the. sexes, God, religion,, morals,
decdncy and-enlightened civilization, public polic.y and the very
exigencies of our-social andpolitical purpose, all have said, with
one voice: "Below this line you shall think and meditate and
choose, and beyond this line you shall abide by your choice?'.
The line is matrimony. And~so, I would. oppose to the trend of
our law, the suggestion that no impediment be placed by the law
on the voluntary retraction from the contract to marry, and that
no retraction be ever permitted from the contract of marriage
with complete restoration of freedom to the parties.
Finally, let it be conceded that the ideal of indissoluble
monogamy may be positively impossible to attain; so is tlhe uni-
versal regard for the sanctity of human life, but we provide the
highest sanction for the preservation of human life. Further-
more, let it be understood, that it is not insisted that we attain
the ideal of indissoluble monogamy. It is insisted, rather, that
we pursue this ideal with all th)e zeal and sanction of our political
institutions, our courts and our legislatures. Governors, in con-
ventions assembled may seek to reconcile the policies of their
states, which range all the way from that of South Carolina, where
divorce is impossible for any cause after marriage, to that of
Washington, where a decree will be rendered "for any other cause
deemed by the court sufficient", 0 5 and the American Bar Associa-
tion and lesser bodies may attempt to draft a uniform law, but the
question still bristles with difficulty, and it will continue to bristle
with difficulty until the legislatures learn, if they ever do, to re-
fuse absolute altogether. Though the several communities are
likely to continue hard to convince when the issue is merely the
superiority of other tribal customs to their own, it should be clear
io Sherman "Roman Law in The Modern World" Sec. 459 (1917).
io5 Chapin, of the New York Bar in "Everybody's" 33:3441-7 Sept. 1915.
